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Comments
Historic Preservation Cases in Pennsylvania: A Survey
and Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing, historic preservationists in Pitts-
burgh are conceding the extinction of "The Moose."' Described as
downtown Pittsburgh's "'most extravagantly designed small build-
ing,'" and distinguished for being the site where the Pittsburgh
Pact, which led to the creation of the Czech nation, was signed, the
1915 Beaux Arts Moose Vill yield its place on Penn Avenue to Al-
legheny International's twin thirty story towers of post-modern de-
sign within the near future.
Opposition to the demolition of the Moose exists and was ably
articulated at a public information meeting conducted by Pitts-
burgh's City Planning Department and attended by seventy-five
people. However, Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation
president and nationally known preservationist, Arthur P. Ziegler,
Jr., after cooperating with architects, city planners, corporate
chiefs and private developers in attempts to formulate plans to
meet use, open space and other project requirements, finally con-
cluded that fighting for the Moose was not worth losing the cul-
tural and social benefits promised by the new development.3 Prof-
its from Allegheny International's towers will be funneled through
a non-profit trust for cultural resources that will aid restoration
and revival of the nearby Stanley Theatre.4 In conjunction with
this so-called "economic engine," the city intends to encourage na-
tional and local historic district designation to spur the growth of a
"cultural" district to replace the existing red light area that pres-
1. Preservation News, March, 1984 at 1, col. 4.
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ently abuts the location of the proposed towers.'
Despite the occurrence of controversies such as the decision to
demolish the Moose, historic preservation activity both nationally
and in Pennsylvania is impressive and expanding.6 The National
Trust for Historical Preservation, in Older and Historic Buildings
and the Preservation Industry, reports that approximately
twenty-one billion dollars is invested in the rehabilitation of his-
toric and older buildings annually. Obviously, such a figure means
historic preservation is not an insignificant force in the construc-
tion industry.8 However, with pre-1940 buildings accounting for
twenty-five percent or more of the total existing building stock, the
sum is less surprising. According to the National Trust report,
" '[p]rivate investment in historic rehabilitation projects certified
by the National Park Service has totaled $2.98 billion in the six
years the investment tax credits have been available, increasing
steadily since 1977 to a high of $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1983.' "10
As of January 1983, there were over 202,000 buildings eligible for
certification and concomitant tax benefits listed in the National
Register of Historic Places." In Pennsylvania, as of March 1, 1984,
5. Id.
6. For an overview of state and federal legislation affecting historic resources in Penn-
sylvania, see NATIONAL CENTER OF PRESERVATION LAW, A PRIMER ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION
LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (1982); Comment, Preservation of Historic Architecture in Pennsyl-
vania: A Report and Recommendations, 85 DICK. L. REV. 717 (1981).
7. Preservation Projects Attract $21 Billion Annually, Says National Trust, [Current
Developments] Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 586 (Dec. 12, 1983). Overall, older and historic
commercial properties annually attract $10 billion in private investments, while residential
buildings more than 50 years old attract $11 billion in investments. Id. For authorative
articles on tax aspects of historic preservation see R. Roddewig, Preservation Law and Eco-
nomics, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (C. Duerksen ed. 1983); R. Stipe,
State and Local Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation in TAX INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION 91 (G. Andres ed. 1980); Powers, Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation: A
Survey, Case Studies and Analysis, 12 UR. L. 103 (1980). See infra notes 188-195.
8. Preservation Projects Attract $21 Billion Annually, Says National Trust, [Current
Developments] Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 586 (Dec. 12, 1983).
9. Id.
10. Id. See also Use of Historic Rehab Tax Credit Continues to Increase, Says Inte-
rior, [Current Developments] Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 744 (Jan. 30, 1984). A recently
released Interior Department Summary indicates there was a 43 percent increase in certified
historic rehabilitation activity over fiscal 1982 and an 87 percent increase over fiscal 1981
activity. Furthermore, 2,572 projects were certified for the 25 percent investment tax credit
on historic rehabilitation costs in 1983, affecting $2.165 billion in private investments. Id.
According to the Interior Department 7,510 certified projects nationwide have qualified for
historic preservation tax incentives and 92 percent of property owners who apply receive the
necessary certification. Id.
11. Preservation Projects Attract $21 Billion Annually, Says National Trust, [Current
Developments] Hous. & Dv. REP. (BNA) 586 (Dec. 12, 1983).
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there were 1,549 listings in the National Register."2 Additionally,
from 1965 when Old Economy, a National Historic Landmark as
well as a National Register district, was listed, over 125 other his-
toric districts have been deemed eligible for inclusion in the Regis-
ter. 13 Surveys of historic sites, buildings, structures, objects and
districts have been conducted in many localities, yielding a pleth-
ora of documentation that is now being analyzed and stored in a
special computer program by the Bureau of Historic
Preservation.
1 4
Additionally, Pennsylvania boasts over 52 historic districts cre-
ated by local ordinances and certified by the Pennsylvania Histori-
cal and Museum Commission. 5 Like historic buildings in National
Register districts, those in locally created historic districts may be
eligible for favorable tax treatments. Indeed, in 1983, two historic
districts and forty projects were certified by the Bureau of Historic
Preservation for the twenty-five percent investment tax credit."
An historic preservation revolving fund is in its incipiency in
Pennsylvania, and a Pennsylvania Preservation League has been
formed. 17 Furthermore, easements, covenants and other zoning de-
vices continue to be employed to preserve the cultural and envi-
ronmental resources in Pennsylvania and elsewhere."
When statistics which purport to show the use of historic preser-
vation as both an economic tool and method by which aesthetic
and cultural values can be transferred from one generation to the
next are juxtaposed with the destruction of historic resources, it is
clear that historic preservation issues are complex. Their resolution
12. Letter from Gregory Ramsey, Chief, Preservation Services, Bureau of Historic
Preservation, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, to Marnie M. Crouch




16. Id. The application consists of two parts. Part 1 is not necessary if a property is
individually listed in the National Register. In calendar year 1983, the Bureau of Historic
Preservation received 253 Part I applications and 219 Part H applications. Id.
17. Letter from Gregory Ramsey, Chief, Preservation Services, Bureau of Historic
Preservation, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, to Marnie M. Crouch
(March 16, 1984) (discussing statewide historic preservation activity).
18. Id. See, e.g., Brenneman, Historic Preservation Restrictions: A Sampling of State
Statue, 8 CONN. L. Rav. 231 (1976). Brenneman, Techniques for Controlling the Surround-
ings of Historic Sites, 36 LAW & CowrriP. PRosS. 416 (1971); Browne & Van Dorn, Charita-
ble Gifts of Partial Interests in Real Property for Conservation Purposes, 29 TAx LAw. 69
(1975). Goetsch, Conservation Restrictions, 8 CONN. L. REv. 383 (1976); Reynolds, Preserva-
tion Easements, 44 APPRAisAL J. 260 (1976); Small, The Tax Benefits of Donating Ease-
ments in Scenic and Historic Property, 7 REAL EsT. L.J. 304 (1979).
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often engenders heated debate, and not infrequently litigation. In
this comment, nine reported Pennsylvania cases will be discussed.
These nine cases fall into four categories. The two earliest cases,
Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment'9 and National Land and In-
vestment Co. v. Kohn,20 provide an introduction to the constitu-
tionality of zoning ordinances. Furthermore, they highlight the sig-
nificance and implications of protecting aesthetically pleasing
urban and rural environments.
First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 2' B.
P. Oil, Inc. v. City of Harrisburg22 and Cleckner v. Harrisburg'
concern provisions of local historic district ordinances enacted pur-
suant to what is commonly referred to by preservationists in Penn-
sylvania as Act 167.24 These cases establish beyond cavil the legiti-
macy of properly structured local historic districts and reflect
judicial awareness of a link between historic preservation and eco-
nomic revitalization.
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Tower, Inc.25 and Payne
v. Kassab26 interpret Pennsylvania's environmental rights amend-
ment.2 7 These cases, no doubt, dampened the amendment's effec-
tiveness as a preservation tool prior to the passage of Pennsylva-
nia's Historic Preservation Act in 1978.8
Finally, two federal cases, Philadelphia Council of Neighbor-
hoods v. Coleman29 and Weintraub v. Rural Electrification Ad-
ministration,"0 the latter involving the demolition of a National
19. 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
20. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
21. 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
22. 99 Dauph. 182 (1977).
23. 101 Dauph. 134, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 393 (1979).
24. Act of June 13, 1961, P.L. 282 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-8004
(Purdon 1972)), amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-8002 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
25. 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886, afl'd, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 585 (1973).
26. 11 Pa. Commw. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), exceptions dismissed, 14 Pa. Commw. 14,
323 A.2d 407 (1974), afl'd, 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
27. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. This amendment, adopted in 1971, provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natu-
ral scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of the people.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
28. Act of November 22, 1978, Pub. L. No. 1160 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
1047.la-lo (Purdon Supp. 1983)).
29. 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
30. 457 F. Supp. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
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Register property, will be discussed with reference to alleged viola-
tions of the National Historic Preservation Acts1 and Executive
Order 115932 which engendered them.
Circumstances surrounding the fate of the Moose illustrate
themes appearing in these nine cases: the demolition of irreplacea-
ble historic landmarks and properties, the linkage between preser-
vation of historically and architecturally significant buildings with
community revitalization, and the social importance of protecting
aesthetically pleasing and culturally meaningful urban (and rural)
areas. This comment will evaluate the status of historic preserva-
tion law in Pennsylvania through an examination of these cases
and their implications for future litigation.
II. AESTHETIC AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
In 1958, in Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,"3 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a single-
family dwelling provision of Pittsburgh's zoning ordinance. In so
doing, the court set forth basic precepts with respect to zoning."
Relying primarily on the landmark United States Supreme Court
case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,35 the court defined zoning as
"the legislative division of a community into areas in each of which
only certain designated uses of land are permitted so that the com-
munity may develop in an orderly manner in accordance with a
comprehensive plan."3 6 Noting that legislative authority to zone
land is derived from the "police power," the court indicated such
power is plenary, limited only by state and federal constitutions.3 "
The court concluded, however, that constitutional provisions were
not intended to upset reasonable property regulations designed to
31. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976)), amended by 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6
(Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 150-153.
32. Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470
(1976). See infra note 163.
33. 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
34. See generally, 1 R. ANDERSON, LAW OF ZOMNG IN PENNSYLVANIA (1982 & Supp.
1983).
35. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. 393 Pa. at 110, 141 A.2d at 609. The court's reference to a comprehensive plan
must be read in light of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1983), which does not require comprehensive
planning prior to zoning. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 34, at §1.13.
37. 393 Pa. at 110, 141 A.2d at 609. The court noted that the only restrictions upon
the power of the legislature to regulate private property rights are imposed by Article 1, § 10
of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the fourteenth amendment. Id.
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achieve a legitimate public purpose. 8
With respect to the Pittsburgh ordinance challenged in Best, the
court recognized that the city, in accordance with its comprehen-
sive plan, had undertaken to control population density through
residential districts for single-family homes, two-family dwellings
and multiple-unit apartment houses.3 9 It further indicated that
such an undertaking was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable if it
bore a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community. 0
The appellant in Best was the owner of a twenty-two room home
on Morewood Avenue, a street lined with large, gracious homes.4"
According to the court, when Best bought her home she knew, or
should have known, of the provisions of the zoning ordinance re-
stricting the property for use as a single-family dwelling.42 There-
fore, the court had no difficulty in affirming the lower court's deci-
sion to sustain the denial of a variance. The court observed that a
variance may be granted "only where a property is subjected to a
hardship unique or peculiar to itself as distinguished from one
arising from the impact of the zoning regulations on the entire
district. 
'48
The appellant urged the court to find that the application of the
ordinance to her property was arbitrary and unreasonable. In her
view, the lower court's two-fold determination that the proposed
use of her home as a multiple-family dwelling was not adverse to
the public health, safety or morals, and that the proposed use of
her home as a multiple-family dwelling would be contrary to the
general welfare was inconsistent.44 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, found that "general welfare" standing alone was
sufficient to justify the zoning ordinance in question.45
Significantly, the court quoted the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, a renowned
historic preservation case:
The proposed act can hardly be said in any ordinary sense to relate to the
public safety, health, or morals. Can it rest upon the less definite and more
38. 393 Pa. at 111, 141 A.2d at 610.
39. 393 Pa. at 111-12, 141 A.2d at 610.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 108, 141 A.2d at 608
42. Id. at 109, 141 A.2d at 608.
43. Id. at 109, 141 A.2d at 609.




inclusive ground that it serves the public welfare? The term public welfare
has never been and cannot be precisely defined. Sometimes it has been said
to include public convenience, comfort, peace and order, prosperity and
similar concepts . ..
The court concluded that acceptance of Best's view would re-
place the statutory law of zoning with the law of nuisance.4 7 There-
fore, the court reiterated its holding in Swade v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment4' that considerations of the general welfare alone can
support the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. The court but-
tressed its conclusion with Justice Douglas' often quoted
statement:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well bal-
anced as well as carefully patrolled.4
The court was satisfied that Pittsburgh's ordinance preserved
wholesome and attractive characteristics of the community and its
property values. Furthermore, it was convinced that requiring Best
to use her property in conformance with existing zoning provisions
would serve to maintain the community's attractive characteristics
and its property values. The court noted that Best introduced no
evidence whatsoever to show that application of the ordinance
would not promote the general welfare.5 e It, therefore, affirmed the
lower court's order sustaining the denial of a variance by the zon-
ing board of adjustment.
The significance of Best lies in the court's articulation of
precepts relative to the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, and
its endorsement of aesthetics as a consideration in determining
their validity subsumed within the concept of general welfare. The
court in alignment with the majority of states, however, refused to
permit an aesthetic purpose, standing alone, to support a restric-
tion on the use of private land.'1 Although Best is analytically
46. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 778, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561
(1955). See 393 Pa. at 115, 141 A.2d at 611.
47. 393 Pa. at 115, 141 A.2d at 612.
48. 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958) (where a zoning ordinance prohibits a business
use in a residential zone, the fact that the property owner's business has no reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety or morals neither makes the ordinance unconstitu-
tional as applied to him nor requires the issuance of a variance).
49. 393 Pa. at 116, 141 A.2d at 612 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
50. 393 Pa. at 118, 141 A.2d at 613.
51. See 1 R. ANDERSoN, supra note 34 at § 5.39. For cases holding that an aesthetic
1984
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sound, it is unfortunate that other Pennsylvania zoning decisions
have been criticized as "erratic both in quality and in treatment of
specific rules of law."52
Subsequent to the Best decision, Justice Bell cast doubt on
whether general welfare standing alone will justify a zoning ordi-
nance. In a concurring opinion in Appeal of Key Realty Co.,55 he
stated: "I would hold (a) that aesthetic values are not a factor in
the consideration of the validity or constitutionality of a zoning
Act or ordinance, and (b) that 'general welfare' alone is not suffi-
cient to validate or constitutionalize a zoning Act or ordinance or
regulation. 5 4 That confusion as to the current state of law exists
as a consequence, is illustrated by two Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court decisions. In one, the court stated, "general welfare
includes considerations of aesthetic and property values. 5 5 In the
other, it noted:
Neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values nor the
stabilization of economic values in a township are, singly, or combined, suf-
ficient to promote the health or the morals or the safety or the general wel-
fare of the township or its inhabitants or property owners, within the mean-
ing of the enabling act or under the Constitution of Pennsylvania."
Seven years after Best, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again
considered the constitutionality of a density ordinance in the
landmark case, National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn,57 the
first and most significant exclusionary zoning case in
purpose standing alone will not support a restriction on the use of private land, see Appeal
of Key Realty Co., 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Rogalski v. Upper Chichester Twp., 406
Pa. 550, 178 A.2d 712 (1962); Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); See
generally, Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (1968). However, for cases that indicate aesthetics may
be considered, see H. A. Steen Indus., Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968);
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Rd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); National
Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Landis v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 414 Pa. 146, 198 A.2d 574 (1964); Rogalski v. Upper Chichester Twp., 406 Pa.
550, 178 A.2d 712 (1962); Appeal of Liggett, 291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927); Mont-Bux, Inc.
v. Twp of Cheltenham, 36 Pa. Commw. 397, 388 A.2d 1106 (1978).
52. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMRICAN PLANNING LAW § 6.12 (1974).
53. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962) (refusal of zoning board to permit erection of an
apartment house, after initial refusal to permit structure because of technical violations and
subsequent amendment to ordinance, sustained).
54. Id. at 119, 182 A.2d at 198 (Bell, J., concurring).
55. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commw. 357, 362, 315 A.2d 335, 338 (1973) (a
zoning regulation excluding mobile homes from a residential district is valid where such
regulation is reasonably related to the general welfare of the community and where there are
unfavorable aesthetic impacts).
56. Soble Constr. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 16 Pa. Commw. 599, 607, 329 A.2d 912,
917 (1974).
57. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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Pennsylvania."
In 1958, the appellee Dorothy McEnnis, a straw party employed
in the office of the real owner's counsel, took title to approximately
130 acres of land known as "Sweetbriar" in Easttown Township.
The court described Easttown Township as a semi-rural or estate
rural community located west of Philadelphia, traversed by the
Main Line of the Pennyslvania Railroad and U.S. Route 30. 5' In
1961, the appellee executed an agreement of sale with National
Land for eighty-five acres of land contingent upon the suitability
of the tract for subdivision development.60 National Land ex-
pended approximately six thousand dollars preparing subdivision
plans for one acre lots. It submitted these plans to Easttown
Township in late 1961.61 In early 1962, however, an amendment to
the zoning ordinance imposed a four acre minimum lot require-
ment upon the land. This prompted National Land to file with the
township a request for a building permit to construct a single
dwelling house on a one acre lot.2' The request was refused, but
National Land was notified of its right to appeal to the board of
adjustment for a variance."3 At the board of adjustment hearing,
the township moved to quash the appeal claiming that it was un-
timely and that no subdivision plan for "Sweetbriar" had been ap-
proved." This motion was granted because no subdivision plan in
fact had been approved and because the board was convinced that
it was not qualified to consider the constitutional issues raised by
National Land.65 On appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of
Chester County, the board's decision was reversed and the case
was remanded for further testimony relative to the substantive is-
sues."6 The township then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
58. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 34, at § 7.12. Professor Anderson opines that the case
"may plausibly be regarded as the foundation opinion in exclusionary zoning litigation." Id.
See also D. MoSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 185 (1977). Exclusionary zoning
has been defined as "the complex of zoning practices which results in closing suburban
housing and land markets to low- and moderate-income families." Davidoff & Davidoff,
Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 509,
519 (1971), and zoning which "raises the price of residential access to a particular area, and
thereby denies that access to members of low-income groups." Sager, Tight Little Islands
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
59. 419 Pa. at 508-09, 521, 215 A.2d 600, 606.
60. Id. at 508, 215 A.2d at 600.
61. Id. at 509, 215 A.2d at 600.
62. Id. at 509, 215 A.2d at 600-01.
63. Id. at 509, 215 A.2d at 601.






The supreme court affirmed the order of the court of common
pleas and concluded that "the board of adjustment committed an
error of law in upholding the constitutionality of the Easttown
Township four acre minimum requirement as applied to the appel-
lee's property." 68 The court reached this result despite the fact
that the board of adjustment refused to address the constitutional-
ity of the requirement and the court of common pleas merely re-
manded the case for development of a record.
Ignoring this questionable procedural base, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reviewed Easttown Township's four acre minimum
lot requirement, noting that it was imposed on approximately
thirty percent of the township's 5,157 acres." The court juxtaposed
National Land's deprivation of part of the value of its property
with the township's justifications for the four acre minimum: inad-
equate means of sewage disposal, inadequate road systems, pollu-
tion and the need to preserve the character of the area. With re-
spect to the township's pollution and infrastructure concerns, the
court said:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them to
more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing communities. It
must not and cannot now be used by those officials as an instrument by
which they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a
governmental body can plan for the future - it may not be used as a means
to deny the future. . . .Zoning provisions may not be used. . . to avoid the
increased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural
growth invariably bring.70
With respect to the township's need to preserve the character of
the area, the court considered four arguments: (1) preserving open
space and creating a "greenbelt," (2) presenting historic sites in
their proper settings, (3) protecting the setting of old homes (some
dating back to the beginning of the Commonwealth), a goal within
the ambit of promoting the general welfare according to the town-
ship, and (4) preserving the rural character of the community.7'
The court was unmoved by these arguments. It noted that if pres-
ervation of open space was an objective, "cluster-zoning" or con-
demnation of development rights with compensation paid to the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613.
69. Id. at 519, 215 A.2d at 606.
70. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
71. Id. at 524-31, 215 A.2d at 608-12.
Vol. 22:855
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condemnees, were alternative means available to that end.72 It con-
cluded that the four acre requirement was an unreasonable way to
preserve open space, particularly since the land would continue to
remain open only if there was no market for four acre lots."8
The historic sites argument advanced by the township was belit-
tled as a "makeweight" by the court 4 The historic sites map in-
troduced by the township demonstrated that the overwhelming
number of historic sites were located in areas of dense population
so that four acre zoning elsewhere in the township would hardly
provide a proper setting for them.75 According to the court, "the
beautification of several structures of minor historical significance
neither calls for nor legitimizes the imposition of low density zon-
ing of the magnitude here contemplated upon 30% of the
township.
'7 6
The township's "general welfare" argument was ill received also.
Contending that the concept of general welfare defies meaningful
definition and constitutes an exceedingly difficult standard against
which to test the validity of legislation, the court indicated that a
zoning ordinance serving purely private interests may be disguised
as legislation for the public welfare. 77 Recognizing that many resi-
dents were probably desirous of keeping the area in a natural state,
the court concluded that the minimum lots size was "purely a mat-
ter of private desire which zoning regulations may not be employed
to effectuate.""17 Furthermore, the court thought it untenable that
areas of less than four acres be declared immune from develop-
ment simply because of an abundance of architecturally and his-
torically interesting old homes nearby.79 Finally, the court deter-
mined that the rural character of the township would not be
preserved by four acre lots; "it would simply be dotted with large
homes on larger lots."80
In 1958, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in another case in-
volving Easttown Township, upheld one acre zoning.81 In National
72. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 611.
73. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.




78. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 611.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 612.
81. Bilbar Const. Co. v. Eastown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851
(1958). Bilbar and Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958), were
1984
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Land, however, it was compelled to denounce four acre zoning as
unconstitutional, finding that "the general welfare is not fostered
or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive or
exclusionary.
'8 2
Clearly, National Land forecloses preservation of historic re-
sources by zoning provisions that smack of being exclusionary. A
subtle inconsistency between the court's decision to uphold the
single-family provisions disputed in Best and its decision in Na-
tional Land exists.83 This may be explained by the court's determi-
nation in National Land that "[e]very zoning case involves a dif-
ferent set of facts and circumstances in light of which the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance must be tested." 8' Alterna-
tively, it may be an indication of the confused state of the law and
the composition of the court.85 Nevertheless for historic preserva-
tionists, the apparent ease with which the notions of the general
welfare and aesthetics can be manipulated meant more predictable
methods of protecting building and landscapes had to be devel-
oped. The court itself suggested the possibility of landowners by
themselves, or with neighbors, purchasing land and protecting it
with deed restrictions or covenants inter se.88
One avenue pursued by historic preservationists was the enact-
ment of historic district ordinances. Unlike National Register His-
toric Districts which contain no such provisions, 87 local historic
district ordinances authorized by Act 16788 provide for the issuance
of certificates of appropriateness by Historical Architectural Re-
view Boards 9 with respect to "the erection, alteration, restoration,
demolition or razing of a building, in whole or in part."90 Further,
they may grant to these boards "the power to institute any pro-
ceedings, at law or in equity, necessary for the enforcement of this
act or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, in the same
manner as in its enforcement of other building, zoning or planning
companion cases.
82. 419 Pa. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
83. In Best, a zoning provision that clearly favored owners of large, stately homes in
urban areas was upheld with positive references to the general welfare and aesthetics while
in National Land, an analogous provision, in effect, was denounced.
84. 419 Pa. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
85. See supra notes 55-56. See also N. WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at § 6.12.
86. 419 Pa. at 523, 215 A.2d at 607-08. See supra note 18.
87. See infra note 152.
88. See supra note 24.
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 8003 (Purdon 1972).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 8004 (Purdon 1972).
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legislations or regulations."91 Prior to National Land, there were
three local historic districts in Pennsylvania.9 2 Between 1966 and
February 1980, thirty-eight additional historic districts were cre-
ated.9s While this development cannot be attributed solely to the
outcome of National Land, reliance on aesthetic or exclusionary
zoning as a means to maintain the historical and architectural in-
tegrity of a community was simply ill-advised and ineffectual.
III. LocAL HISTORIC DISTRICTS
National Trust for Historic Preservation attorney, Frank Her-
bert, also former executive director of the prominent New York
City Landmarks Preservation Commission and an important figure
in the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
94
case, recently said in conjunction with his appointment as head of
a program to aid communities setting up or administering historic
districts:
It's the old 'taking' issue . . . Some developers think their property rights
are inviolate and they can build as they please on their land. But zoning is
an established concept, and we've finally established preservation as both a
reasonable use of government power and a continuation of zoning regula-
tions. In other words, if you set up your district right and administer it
properly, you don't have to worry about law suits.95
Decisions in Pennsylvania courts and elsewhere attest to the ve-
racity of Herbert's statement. Three reported cases from the late
nineteen seventies conclusively establish that the refusal of Boards
of Historical Architectural Review to issue permits to demolish
buildings within historic districts pursuant to Act 167, the historic
district act, is not an unconstitutional "taking" of property.
The first case arising under the historic district act, First Pres-
byterian Church of York v. City Council of York,9e concerned York
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 8005 (Purdon 1972).
92. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, HIsToRIc Dis-
TRICTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 7-8 (2d ed. 1980).
93. Id.
94. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the United States Supreme Court upheld
New York City's landmark ordinance against a claim that it violated plaintiff's constitution-
ally protected property rights. Id.
95. Preservation News, March 1984, at 7, col. 2. Herbert's statement that preservation
is a continuation of zoning power is not novel. The preservation of historically and aestheti-
cally significant buildings has been described as being "in a very real sense a branch of the
law of land use and development" with illuminating parallels "to the history of zoning and
similar land use controls-subdivision regulation and master planning." Hershman, Critical
Legal Issues in Historic Preservation, 12 URB. L. 19 (1980).
96. 25 Pa. Commw. 154, 360 A.2d 257 (1976).
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House, "an exceptional specimen of Victorian Italian-Villa archi-
tecture, virtually unaltered, and representing the highest level of
design, workmanship, materials and aesthetic values of the time of
construction. 9 7 In 1972 the appellant church applied for permis-
sion to demolish York House, which adjoined the church edifice,
and which it had acquired in 1959. Notably, York House was listed
in the National Register of Historic Places,98 as well as being
within the local historic district.
Procedurally, after a hearing at which York's Board of Historical
Architectural Review recommended refusal of the demolition per-
mit, which advice the city council followed, the church appealed to
the Court of Common Pleas of York County pursuant to the local
agency law.99 That court remanded the case for further hearings
and findings with the aim of obtaining a record sufficient for appli-
cation of the Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt00 test of
constitutionality. 101 At a further hearing, at which both parties ad-
duced additional evidence, the Board again recommended denial of
the church's application, and city council again followed its recom-
mendation. The court of common pleas upheld the council's ac-
tions and the church appealed to commonwealth court alleging an
unconstitutional "taking."10 2
Between the time of the lower court's order of remand and the
church's second appeal, Maher v. City of New Orleans,105 a case
involving an historic district as opposed to an individual landmark
as in Snug Harbor, was decided. In Maher, the Louisiana district
court determined that the historic district ordinance affecting the
97. Id. at 158, 360 A.2d at 259.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). The test employed in Snug Harbor was
stated as follows:
The criterion for commercial property is where the continuance of the landmark pre-
vents the owner from obtaining an adequate return. A comparable test for a charity
would be where maintenance of the landmark either physically or financially prevents
or seriously intereferes with carrying out the charitable purpose. In this instance the
answer would depend on the proper resolution of subsidiary questions, namely,
whether the preservation of these buildings would seriously interfere with the use of
the property, whether the buildings are capable of conversion to a useful purpose
without excessive cost, or whether the cost of maintaining them without use would
entail serious expenditure-all in the light of the purposes and resources of the
petitioner.
Id. at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See also 25 Pa. Commw. at 159, 360 A.2d at 259.
101. 25 Pa. Commw. at 158-59, 360 A.2d at 259.
102. Id. at 159, 360 A.2d at 260.
103. 371 F.Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Vieux Carre was a proper zoning regulation within the scope of the
police power. Furthermore, it found, in the words of the common-
wealth court that:
[T]he test of constitutionality to be applied to a particular property for
which a demolition permit was refused was not that of whether the detri-
ment to the individual landowner outweighed the benefit conferred on the
public, but that of whether the ordinance went so far as to preclude the use
of the property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted.1°4
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order refusing Maher's application to demolish his Victo-
rian cottage, noting "Maher did not show that the sale of the prop-
erty was impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a
reasonable rate of return, or that other potential use of the prop-
erty was foreclosed."' 10 5
Commonwealth court Judge Rogers approved the lower court's
utilization of an identical analysis with respect to the First Presby-
terian Church. He concluded, as did the court below, that the
church's evidence only established that it had no desire to use the
building for religious purposes, not that the building was incapable
of conversion to a useful purpose without excessive cost.106 Finding
support from Pennsylvania cases dealing with applications for use
variances, 0 7 the court determined that there is no unconstitutional
"taking" if the property owner cannot establish that the regulation
precludes use of the property for any purpose for which it is rea-
sonably adapted. 08
The second case involving a local municipal ordinance, B.P. Oil,
Inc. v. City of Harrisburg'0 9 involved the appellant's "fixation" on
demolishing structures of Richardsonian style, featuring facades
embellished with intricately designed terra cotta plaques and other
architectural delights, and constructing a gas station in "Historic
Harrisburg." This historic district was created by city ordinance
104. 25 Pa. Commw. at 161-62, 360 A.2d at 260. See also 371 F.Supp. at 662.
105. 561 F.2d at 1066.
106. 25 Pa. Commw. at 162, 360 A.2d at 261.
107. See, e.g., Peirce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 262, 189 A.2d 138 (1963);
Crafton Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 82, 185 A.2d 533 (1962); Magrann v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 404 Pa. 198, 170 A.2d 553 (1961); Lally Zoning Case, 404 Pa. 174, 171 A.2d 161 (1961);
J. Richard Fretz, Inc. v. Hilltown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. 471, 336 A.2d
464 (1975); Marple Gardens, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 Pa. Commw. 436, 303 A.2d
239 (1973); DiBello v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 4 Pa. Commw. 546, 287 A.2d 856 (1972).
108. 25 Pa. Commw. at 162, 360 A.2d at 261. Cf. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
393 Pa. 106, 109, 141 A.2d 606, 609 (1958).
109. 99 Dauph. 182 (1977).
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passed by Harrisburg City Council on July 23, 1974. One of the
oldest residential districts in Harrisburg containing nineteenth and
early twentieth century townhouses and mansions, the portion of
the district in question also was listed in the National Register of
Historic Places in January 1976.1
Relying on tests articulated in First Presbyterian Church of
York and Maher, the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
affirmed the order of Harrisburg City Council denying the appel-
lant's request for a permit to build the gas station, noting that
"B.P. has failed to sustain its burden of showing conclusively that
these Second Street properties could not be used for rentals, nor
does the record indicate any attempt to sell. The sole basis for this
appeal is B.P.'s fixation on a gas station." ''
Likewise, Cleckner v. Harrisburg1"2 involved an appeal under the
recently enacted local agency law from a decision of the City Coun-
cil of Harrisburg denying a permit to demolish two vacant houses.
Although testimony concerning the aesthetic-historic value and the
economic value of the buildings was conflicting, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Dauphin County concluded that the Board of Histor-
ical Architectural Review, whose recommendation city council
adopted, did not abuse its discretion in relying on appellee's evi-
dence.113 Further, the court decided it was not at liberty to declare
that the appellant's view of the evidence was correct and more rea-
sonable.' 14 The court then reiterated that denial of the best and
most profitable use of the property was not the test for an uncon-
stitutional "taking."" 5 Although the appellant testified that he
placed a sign on the properties and advertised them for sale in
Preservation News, a national paper published by the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, the court found Cleckner did not
"proceed prudently in offering his properties for sale," and that he
had set an inflated asking price. According to the court, "if appel-
lant were able to sell his properties for their fair market value, he
could not consider them 'taken' by operation of the Historic Dis-
trict Ordinance."" 6
110. Id. at 183.
111. Id. at 185. See First Presbyterian Church of York, 25 Pa. Commw. at 161-62, 360
A.2d at 261; Maher, 516 F.2d at 1066.
112. 101 Dauph. 134, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 393 (1979).
113. Id. at 137, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 398.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 138, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 400. See generally Note, Historic Zoning: The
Test for an Unconstitutional Taking, 81 DICK. L. Rv. 136 (1976).
116. 101 Dauph. at 139, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 401.
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While it is exceedingly unlikely that these decisions would be
overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,117 Judge Kramer's
concurring opinion in First Presbyterian Church of York, in which
Judges Crumlish and Mencer joined, highlights judicial reserva-
tions respecting historic district ordinances. Noting the tension be-
tween expansion of police power concepts and erosion of private
property principles, Judge Kramer asserted that "we have reached
a constitutional precipice that an advancement of even a fraction
of an inch will result in excessive governmental encroachment
upon private property rights."' 18 In particular, he was skeptical of
private property owners being made to make their property availa-
ble for public view without compensation. In the view of three
members of the seven member court, the public should pay for
protecting, restoring or maintaining places of historical value if the
public wants to use, take or apply a private property for these
purposes.""
In addition, although the Penn Central and Maher decisions
have made historic preservation regulation on the local level far
less susceptible to challenges on "taking" grounds, the issue has
not been completely settled.120 Notably, the Supreme Court in
Penn Central expressed the view that there is no " 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic inju-
ries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons." 21 It concluded that "[w]hether a particular restriction will
be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the particu-
117. Courts in other jurisdictions have repeatedly upheld the validity of architectural
control ordinances as police power regulations when historic or tourists districts are con-
cerned. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); Sunad, Inc. v. City of
Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798
(1953); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Town
of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964); Opinion of
the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); City of Sante Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192
N.E.2d 74 (1963); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
118. First Presbyterian Church of York, 25 Pa. Commw. at 165, 360 A.2d at 263.
119. Id. at 166, 360 A.2d at 263.
120. See D. Bonderman, Federal Constitutional Issues, in A HANDBOOK FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION LAW (C. Duerksen ed. 1983). Edmondson, Historic Preservation Regulation
and Procedural Due Process, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 743, 743-44 (1981); Hershman, Critical Legal
Issues In Historic Preservation, 12 URBAN L. 19, 27 (1980).
121. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
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lar circumstances [in that] case.' "12 Proceeding to identify factors
relative to its "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" the Court em-
phasized the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,
and the character of the governmental action. It also opined that
the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations
was a relevant consideration. 123 It is more likely, however, that fu-
ture challenges to historic preservation ordinances will be based on
procedural deficiencies.
24
These sentiments of reservation are not confined to the judici-
ary. Particularly with respect to landmark ownership in downtown
areas with high land values, the perception that such ownership is
less profitable than redevelopment of landmark sites exists. Ac-
cordingly, historic district ordinances have proven most useful in
preserving landmarks and buildings that are either within residen-
tial areas or outside areas with high land values. This is because
these areas hold little interest for speculators and tend to contain
smaller, more readily maintainable residential structures in low
density settings. Owners frequently welcome historic district desig-
nation for the sake of prestige and property values. Furthermore,
building owners recognize that costs associated with litigating per-
mit denials are likely to offset gains from demolition or altera-
tion. 25 Clearly, nonlegal factors are primarily responsible for the
success of historic districts.
This conclusion is bolstered by surveys of agencies responsible
for administering historic district ordinances which reveal that
most communities are enthusiastic about their ordinances.' 2 De-
spite the potential for distinct tax advantages, however, dissatis-
faction can lead to repeal of historic district ordinances. For exam-
ple, Upland Borough in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, repealed
its historic district and repeal is being threatened in Allentown as
well. 12  Nevertheless, in most instances, advantages, such as in-
creased property values, blight reversal and heightened awareness
of the nation's heritage, offset potential politicalization of the
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Edmondson, supra note 120, at 744.
125. See generally Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preserva-
tion of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 582 (1972).
126. See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 8-11 (2d ed.
1981); Costonis, supra note 125, at 582 n.33.
127. Letter from Gregory Ramsey, Chief, Preservation Services, Bureau of Historic
Preservation, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, to Marnie M. Crouch
(March 16, 1984) (discussing historic preservation activities in Pennsylvania).
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review of board determinations by city councils, delays in process-
ing permits and noncooperation due to a community consensus in
favor of having an historic district ordinance. 2 '
In an attempt to improve the efficacy of municipally sanctioned
preservation efforts, the Bureau of Historic Preservation is pres-
ently preparing a draft amendment to Act 167 to strengthen the
ability of communities without architecturally and historically co-
hesive districts to preserve landmarks.129 Both Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh, cities exempt from Act 167, have landmark ordi-
nances.13 0 Thus, the proposed amendment would rectify the situa-
tion with respect to the rest of the state.
IV. PENNSYLVANIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND
HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT
In the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, the mushrooming of ur-
ban and suburban development and the concomitant dwindling of
rural landscapes spawned concern about the preservation of open
space and the historical and aesthetic components of the American
landscape. The irreversible destruction of this patrimony was not
infrequently tied to the great variety of state and federal programs
that affect the form and distribution of urban development. Argu-
ably, federally assisted highways constructed by states and subject
to extensive federal regulation affected and continue to affect the
landscape more than any other federal program, "implementing in
effect a hidden policy to bring land into development with an even
handed dynamism that enhances access by automobile to center
cities and remote wilderness at an extraordinary pace." 31
This concern prompted adoption in 1971 of what is known as
Pennsylvania's environmental rights amendment. 32 Entitled "Nat-
ural resources and the public estate," the amendment gives Penn-
128. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, supra note 126,
at 8-11.
129. Letter from Gregory Ramsey, Chief, Preservation Services, Bureau of Historic
Preservation, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, to Marnie M. Crouch
(March 16, 1984) (discussing historic preservation activities in Pennsylvania).
130. See generally Tinkcom, The Philadelphia Historical Commission: Organization
and Procedures, 36 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 386 (1971).
131. W. Reilly, National Landuse Policy, 1414, 1415 in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). See also Brenneman, Techniques for Controlling the
Surroundings of Historic Sites, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoRs. 416 (1971).
132. PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 27. Article I, § 27 was passed on by the legislature in 1969,
amended and then approved in 1970, and finally adopted by the voters on May 18, 1971.
Payne v. Kassab, 468 Pa. 226, 246 n.22, 361 A.2d 263, n.22 (1976). See Broughton, The
Proposed Pennsylvania Declaration of Environmental Rights, 41 PA. B.A.Q. 421 (1970).
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sylvanians "a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environ-
ment."1' " It declares that public natural resources are the common
property of all people and directs the Commonwealth, as trustee,
to conserve and maintain them for the benefit of everyone. 34 Not
surprisingly, historic preservationists, among others, sought to util-
ize the amendment, believing it to be self-executing - not requir-
ing legislative authority for suits to be brought.
In two cases, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc.'"  and Payne v. Kassab," 6 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania addressed preservation issues within the ambit of the
seemingly plain words of the amendment. The Gettysburg tower,
described by the New York Times as a "monster," subjecting Get-
tysburg to "a new low in historical tastelessness,' 137 was designed
to appeal to fast-paced tourist schedules and to avoid the need to
actually walk the battlefield. Its promoters opined that the educa-
tional benefits of the tower would surpass existing educational ser-
vices. 138 Unconvinced, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought
an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County to en-
join construction of the tower on private property near the battle-
field, alleging the 307-foot tower would cause immediate and irrep-
arable harm to the natural, scenic and aesthetic values of the
environment. Two years of litigation ensued before a split Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in a heavily criticized decision, 3 9 held that
article 1, section 27 provisions merely state a general principle of
law. According to the court, supplemental legislation was required
to define the values which the amendment sought to protect and to
avoid implicating the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. 4 0 In a forceful dissent, Chief Justice
Jones argued that the court chose to emasculate the amendment.14 '
He contended that the amendment created a common law public
133. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
134. Id.
135. 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973).
136. 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
137. N.Y. Times, December 31, 1970, at 22, col.2.
138. 454 Pa. at 214-15, 311 A.2d at 599 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Comment, The Gettysburg Tower Case: Testing Pennsylvania's Envi-
ronmental Rights Amendment, 48 TEMp. L.Q. 46, 52 (1974); Comment, An Analysis of
Pennsylvania's New Environmental Rights Amendment and the Gettysburg Tower Case,
78 DICK. L. REv. 331 (1973).
140. 454 Pa. at 205, 311 A.2d at 594-95.
141. Id. at 208, 311 A.2d at 596 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
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trust. The trust res consisted of "natural, scenic, historic and aes-
thetic values of the environment." The trust beneficiaries were the
people of the Commonwealth, and the trustee was the executive
branch. " "
Subsequent to the National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower deci-
sion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Payne v. Kas-
sab."3 In Payne, several residents of the City of Wilkes-Barre and
a group of students from Wilkes College in Wilkes-Barre sought to
enjoin the widening of River Street, a project proposed by the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.1 4 4 The street-widen-
ing project, plaintiffs argued, would adversely affect River Com-
mon, a thirty-two acre tract on the Susquehanna River used con-
tinuously as a public common since 1770, the year the original
town of Wilkes-Barre was plotted out by Connecticut settlers.
1 45 It
was undisputed that public officials were entrusted with the man-
agement of the land and were precluded from diverting it to either
private use or public use not within the dedicatory language.14 6
The plan envisioned by the Department of Transportation called
for diversion of less than one acre of land, and the removal of
twenty-three trees and two historical markers. The plan did, how-
ever, call for replacement of the tree lawn and re-landscaping."
7
On appeal from the dismissal of their complaint, the plaintiffs
argued that the project was outside the scope of the statutory dedi-
cations of the land as a public common, that the Department of
Transportation abused its discretion and violated obligations im-
posed by Act 120148 by approving the project, and that the Com-
monwealth through the Department of Transportation, violated its
duties as trustee under article 1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution."
9
The plaintiffs asserted that the amendment was self-executing
and that they had standing as beneficiaries of the public trust to
142. Id. at 209, 311 A.2d at 596 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
143. 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
144. 468 Pa. at 229, 361 A.2d at 264.
145. Id. at 235, 361 A.2d at 267.
146. Id. at 237, 361 A.2d at 268.
147. Id. at 233-34, 361 A.2d at 266.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 519 (Purdon Supp. 1975). This act required that the
Department of Transportation determine that no feasible or prudent alternative to the pro-
ject existed and the project was planned to minimize harm to the affected tract. Id. See 468
Pa. at 239, 361 A.2d at 269.
149. 468 Pa. at 234-44, 361 A.2d at 267-72.
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bring suit to enjoin the Commonwealth from breach of its duties. 150
Although the commonwealth court agreed with the plaintiffs that
the amendment was self-executing, contrary to the National Get-
tysburg Battlefield Tower view, the supreme court chose not to ex-
plore that "difficult terrain." The court distinguished National
Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, which involved use of private prop-
erty, noting that "the property here involved is public property, a
'public Common,' . . . possessed of certain natural, scenic, historic
and aesthetic values."''
The court then considered whether the street-widening project
would violate the trust imposed on the Commonwealth to conserve
these values. The court recognized that static land use practices
were not compelled by the public trust doctrine and that a balanc-
ing of interests approach was required for changed uses of public
trust property. 52 However, the court resorted to familiar standards
of judicial review for administrative actions, thus permitting reallo-
cations of public trust property absent an abuse of discretion. In
short, the court concluded that compliance with Act 120 was
equivalent to satisfying trustee duties imposed by article 1, section
27, and thus denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. 58
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Historic Preservation
Act 4 five years after Chief Justice Jones penned his dissent in
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower and two years after Payne
v. Kassab, specifically finding "section 27 of article 1 of the Consti-
tution of Pennsylvania makes the Commonwealth trustee for the
preservation of the historic values of the environment.' ' 55 Addi-
tionally, the legislature declared that, confronted with rapid social
and economic development, the irreplaceable historical, architec-
tural, archeological and cultural heritage of Pennsylvania should
be preserved because it promotes the public health, property and
general welfare." 6 Significantly, the act authorized the Attorney
General, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
any political subdivision and any person to bring actions to protect
150. Id. at 244, 361 A.2d at 272.
151. Id. at 245, 361 A.2d at 272
152. Id. at 246, 361 A.2d at 273.
153. Id. at 246-47, 361 A.2d at 273. See generally Comment, The Gettysburg Tower
Case: Testing Pennsylvania's Environmental Rights Amendment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 46 (1974).
154. Act of November 22, 1978, P.L. 1160 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1a-
lo (Purdon Supp. 1983)).




or preserve any historic resource in the Commonwealth. 15 7
The enforcement provisions of Pennsylvania's Historic Preserva-
tion Act have yet to be tested. Nevertheless, the Act's findings and
declaration of policy, as well as its creation of an Historic Preser-
vation Board with duties to advise the Pennsylvania Historical and
Museum Commission on criteria for inclusion of historic resources
in the Pennsylvania Register of Historic Places and to recommend
nominations to the National Register, indicate that if the Gettys-
burg Tower case were to decided today, a different result might
obtain. Thus,, at least with respect to historic resources, the envi-
ronmental rights amendment is no longer emasculated.
V. HISTORIC PRESERVATION CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Reported Pennsylvania cases litigated in federal courts have all
alleged violations of the National Historic Preservation Act of
1966,1 5 the key law designed to promote identification and preser-
157. Id. at § 1047.1(n). This section was repealed in part insofar as it was inconsistent
with the Commonwealth's Attorneys Act, Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 950 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 732-101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1983)). It does not appear that this Act
would jeopardize enforcement of the Historic Preservation Act or article 1, § 27.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 470(0 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 106 requires that:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed
Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal
department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall,
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or
prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in
or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such Federal
agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under
sections 470i to 470v of this title a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to
such undertaking.
Id. For detailed discussions of early historic preservation efforts, see C. HOSMER, PRESENCE
OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF PRESERVATION MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WIL-
LIAMSBURG (1965) and C. HOSmER, PRESERVATION COMES OF AGE: FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO
THE NATIONAL TRUST (1981). For more recent developments in federal historic preservation
law, see THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION & THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRESERVATION LAW,
A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (C. Duerksen ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK] and Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Law: National Historic Preservation
Act, Executive Order 11593, and Other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 31 (1976). Fowler discusses the development of federal historic preservation
law, including the Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and
the Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Fowler indicates
that the 1935 Act was significant because it established a national policy of historic preser-
vation and provided authority for the development of an administrative program to identify
and evaluate historical cultural resources of national significance. Id. at 34. The 1966 Act
removed the national significance standard, thus expanding the role of the federal govern-
ment in the preservation of resources of state and local significance. Id. at 39.
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vation of America's historical and cultural resources. Section 106,
the heart of the 1966 act, interrelates two major components " of
the Historic Preservation Act: the National Register of Historic
Places160 and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. 1 ' It
159. A third component of the 1966 Act is the authorization of federal grants to states
and the appointment of state historic preservation officers to implement federal historic
preservation programs. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)-(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) details the require-
ments of a state historic preservation program, the duties of a state historic preservation
officer and the mechanism for certifying local governments to carry out the purposes of the
act and to become eligible for funds under § 470c(c). Provisions for the administration of a
matching grants-in-aid program are provided in 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d). These funds are availa-
ble to the states, and in certain cases to local governments, for surveying, planning, acquisi-
tion and development. Due to limited appropriations to the fund by Congress, activities
such as preparing National Register nominations, reviewing tax certification applications
and developing technical preservation information are emphasized by the states, all of which
have historic preservation laws. HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 196 n.13, 226.
160. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "expand and
maintain a National Register of Historic Places composed of districts, sites, buildings, struc-
tures and objects significant in American History, architecture, archaeology, engineering,
and culture." Id. The Register is administered by the Keeper of the National Register
within the National Park Service. The Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service ad-
ministered the federal program between 1978 and 1981 prior to Secretarial Order No. 3060,
Amendment No. 1 (February 19, 1981) which abolished it and reinvested responsibility for
the Register with the National Park Service. HANDBOOK, Supra note 158, at 197 n.19. Quali-
fications for listing in the Register and nomination procedures are detailed at 36 C.F.R. §§
60, 63 (1983) and 48 Fed. Reg. 46306 (1983).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 470(i) establishes the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Sec-
tions 470(j)-(v) and 36 C.F.R. § 800 (1983) detail the scope of the Council's responsibilities
and powers. Generally, the Council, which is a small (20 person staff, $1 million annual
budget) independent federal agency, is to advise other federal agencies on effects their ac-
tions may have on historic properties and to advise the President and Congress on preserva-
tion matters. HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 210-11. The intricacies of the section 106 review
process, codified at 36 C.F.R. 800 (1983), are diagrammed in HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at
249.
To satisfy § 106, the agency must:
1. apply the council's "criteria of effect" to proposed federal actions that
could have an effect on National Register or Register- eligible properties;
2. if there is such an effect, apply the council's criteria of "adverse" effect to
determine the precise nature of the effect;
3. if the effect is found to be adverse, request the comments of the council;
4. obtain the comments of the council, which must be taken into account in
the agency's decision-making processes-the comments may be obtained either
by (i) an MOA [Memorandum of Agreement] entered into by the council, fed-
eral agency (or its legal delegatee), and the SHPO [state historic preservation
officer] or (ii) written comments from the full council or a panel of its
members;
5. if the comments are all in an MOA, the agency must carry out the terms of
the agreement. Failure to do so effectively voids the agreement; and
6. if the agency received only the comments of the council, it must demon-
strate that it took the comments into account in reaching a final decision on
the project, and that its behavior falls within the purview of the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, but it is not required to follow the council's advice.
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directs the head of any federal agency having direct or indirect ju-
risdiction over a proposed federal or federally-assisted undertaking
in any state and the head of any federal department or indepen-
dent agency having authority to license any undertakings to take
into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site,
building, structure or object included in, or eligible for inclusion in,
the National Register prior to approving the expenditure of any
federal funds on the undertaking. Furthermore, it requires that the
Advisory Council be afforded a reasonable opportunity to comment
with regard to such undertaking.
In Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations v. Cole-
man,162 a group of civic and community organizations and individ-
uals sought declaratory and injunctive relief in an action against
the United States Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator
of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, the Secretary
of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the City of
Philadelphia and its mayor. An alleged violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Historic Preservation Act of 1966
and Executive Order 11593,163 was only one of the numerous legal
challenges raised by the plaintiffs in opposition to the United
States Secretary of Transportation's decision to provide a $240
million federal grant to Philadelphia for construction of a com-
muter rail tunnel connecting the existing Penn Central Suburban
Station with a new underground station.'"
Prior to the commencement of the action, an environmental as-
sessment had been prepared by'the City of Philadelphia and its
consultant. The assessment included the results of community
meetings and public hearings, as well as the A-95 review, a process
requiring applicants for federal assistance to solicit comments con-
cerning proposed projects from interested parties. 165 A draft envi-
HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 265-66.
162. 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afld, F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
163. See supra note 32. Executive Order 11593 supplemented the Historic Preserva-
tion Act of 1966. It required federal agencies to "locate, inventory and nominate all sites,
buildings, districts and objects" on their lands no later than July 1, 1973. Arguably, Execu-
tive Order 11593 was "an attempt to prod the bureaucratic behemoth into some sort of
concrete action .. " There was a problem with funding, "although not really from lack of
it but more from a lack of what to do with it." Note, Historic Preservation-An Individ-
ual's Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018, 1022 n.19 (1979). See also S. REP. No. 781, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 988, 2989. The 1980 amend-
ments to the Historic Preservation Act codified most of the executive order's requirements.
164. 437 F. Supp. at 1345.
165. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95 was adopted pursuant to the
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4244 (1976), repealed by Act
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ronmental impact statement was subsequently prepared and circu-
lated for comment to nine agencies and parties, including the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Preservation
Committee of the Philadelphia Chapter, Society of Architectural
Historians.166
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
considering all of the plaintiffs' challenges, limited the scope of its
review to that provided by the Administrative Procedures Act -
only agency actions found to be arbitrary and capricious or to in-
volve an abuse of discretion or legal error could be set aside.1 17 Af-
ter a searching and careful review of the record, including the envi-
ronmental assessment, the court held that there was no basis for
overturning the agency decision or remanding the case.1"'
The court, considering the alleged violations of section 106 and
Executive Order 11593, noted that the environmental impact state-
ment listed seventeen historic buildings and structures that might
be adversely affected by the project, including the Reading Termi-
nal and train shed and the Reading Terminal Market. The court
found that the effect of the tunnel on historic buildings was ade-
quately considered and there was no violation of the statute or ex-
ecutive order. It cited consideration of alternative alignments of
the tunnel, an engineering study to determine the feasibility of un-
derpinning the Reading Terminal and a memorandum of agree-
ment between the Urban Mass Transportation Authority and the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to support its
conclusion. 169
of September 13, 1982, P.L. 97-258, 96 Stat. 1068. Similar provisions appear at 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6501-6508 (West 1983).
166. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976)
applies to major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, including historic and cultural resources. It requires than an environmental impact
statement be prepared if both parts of its two-part test are met, i.e., there is a proposal for
"a major federal action" "significantly affecting" the environment. NEPA applies to a
broader range of historic and cultural resources than does the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act, but the latter applies to a broader range of federal actions. See HANDBOOK, supra
note 158, at 215-20, 270-309.
167. 437 F. Supp. at 1346. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1976). Judicial review of agency
decisions has ensured compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). Although NEPA neither requires a federal agency to take or
refrain from taking a particular action nor forbids demolition of significant buildings, it
insures that an agency has taken a "hard look" at environmental consequences. See HND-
BOOK, supra note 158, at 301.
168. 437 F. Supp. at 1350.
169. The environmental impact statement is divided into three sections: alternatives,
including the proposed action; description of the affected environment; and environmental
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Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations details an
assault on an expensive public undertaking. It is representative of
similar actions and illustrates not only the scope of review utilized
by courts with respect to administrative determinations under the
National Historic Preservation Act, but also the interrelationship
between the National Historic Preservation Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act.
Shortly after the third circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion in Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations,
Weintraub v. Rural Electrification Administration17 0 was decided.
The plaintiffs, the Director of the Office of Historic Preservation
and Historic Harrisburg Association, Inc., alleged violation of sec-
tion 106. At different points in the proceeding, plaintiffs sought a
temporary restraining order to prevent demolition of the Tele-
graph Building, a property listed in the National Register of His-
toric Places, and injunctive relief.
An initial issue decided by Judge Muir was the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to set forth the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction.17 1 Specifically, the defendants contended that the as-
sertion of $10,000 in damages was speculative. Citing Save the
Courthouse v. Lynn,' 72 Judge Muir recognized that the building
had sufficient historical and architectural significance to warrant
inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. He, therefore,
concluded that "considerable interests are involved in the preser-
vation of cultural resources and that would seem to put beyond
question the jurisdictional amount provided for in § 1331(a)."o t
He recognized that federal courts are frequently asked to protect
intangibles, such as goodwill adhering to a trademark and rights of
free speech and free assembly, and determined that "there is no
reason to lay down a rule of law that the cultural, historical, and
architectural value of a building presents a non-justiciable problem
of valuation.
17 4
The defendants alleged, also, that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
citing United States v. SCRAP. 7 5 Judge Muir set forth the appli-
consequences. All reasonable alternatives to the proposed action must be conscientiously
evaluated. See HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 292.
170. 475 F. Supp. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
171. 475 F. Supp. at 87.
172. 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
173. 475 F. Supp. at 87.
174. Id.
175. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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cable standard: injury in fact to the plaintiffs caused by the chal-
lenged action and injury arguably within the zone of interests pro-
tected or regulated by the statutes that the federal agencies
allegedly violated. 7 6 The court indicated that the injury in fact re-
quirement was met by showing harm to the aesthetic and environ-
mental well-being of "Historic Harrisburg," which had among its
members individuals who resided in the area of the Telegraph
Building.17 Finding "[an association even in the absence of injury
to itself, may have standing as a representative of its members," he
asserted that the plaintiffs' complaint was arguably within the
zone of interests section 106 was designed to protect. 78 With re-
spect to the Director of the Office of Historic Preservation, Judge
Muir determined that as State Historic Preservation Officer, the
director had standing and acted as parens patriae for the citizens
of the Commonwealth. '7 This portion of Judge Muir's opinion was
cited in Committee to Save the Fox Building v. Birmingham
Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta'80 for the proposi-
tion that a showing of the imminent demolition of a building in the
National Register was sufficient to establish standing to sue.
Before addressing the critical issue-the sufficiency of federal in-
volvement in the demolition of the Telegraph Building as required
by section 106-the court found the Rural Electrification Adminis-
tration to be a suable party. The court denied defendants' motion
to dismiss, on the ground that it was not such a party because of
procedural defects.' 8 '
The standard for granting an injunction, the court noted, is that
the moving party show a reasonable probability of eventual success
and irreparable injury if relief is not granted. The court indicated
that it would consider the possibility of harm to other interested
parties and the public interest as well. 8 2 With respect to these
considerations, Judge Muir found that the plaintiffs established ir-
reparable harm and that the public interest would be served by the
preservation of the Telegraph Building. Furthermore, he concluded
that the substantial financial losses the defendant would suffer




180. 497 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
181. 457 F. Supp. at 88-89. The defendant's argument that the United States was not
a named defendant was not set forth in the brief accompanying the motion to dismiss. Id.
182. Id. at 89.
Vol. 22:855
Historic Preservation
were outweighed by the irreparable harm to the plaintiffs and the
Harrisburg community.""
Nevertheless, the court focused on the facts concerning the own-
ership and destruction of the building, finding that Pennsylvania
Rural Electric Association (PREA) and defendant Allegheny Elec-
tric Cooperative, Inc. (AEC) essentially owned the defendant Tele-
graph Building Corporation and that parking problems affecting
AEC's and PREA's Locust Building headquarters adjacent to the
Telegraph Building prompted the sought after demolition.'" The
court chronicled the complicated factual scenario, summarizing it
as follows: "[pjlaintiffs essentially maintain that because federal
funds enabled AEC to construct the Locust Building Corporation
Project which created the need for parking and thus caused the
proposal for demolition ... the demolition is a federal
undertaking.' ' 85
The court determined that "Congress only intended to control
direct federal spending for actions or projects which would other-
wise destroy buildings on the National Register. Congress did not
intend to reach every effect of federal spending."'' 6 It categorically
rejected plaintiffs' interpretation of section 106 as too far reaching,
citing Ely v. Velde,"' in which the plaintiffs, Virginia residents,
appealed the denial of an injunction but failed eventually to meet
their burden of proving that through bookkeeping shifts the De-
partment of Welfare and Institutions intended to finance construc-
tion of a medical reception center with federal funds, thus trigger-
ing agency compliance with section 106.
The court also interpreted the word "license" in section 106,
since plaintiffs argued that Rural Electrical Administration regula-
tions requiring approval of the demolition constituted a license.
The court determined that Congress intended the word "license"
to have its technical meaning - "a written document constituting
permission or right to engage in some governmentally supervised
activity."' 88 According to the court, "Congress did not intend to
affect every action which required federal approval."'
183. Id.
184. Id. at 90.
185. Id. at 91.
186. Id.
187. 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir.
1974).




The court, therefore, denied the plaintiffs' request for a prelimi-
nary injunction, finding that the minimal showing was not out-
weighed by the other criteria. Nevertheless, it placed the case on
the trial list for a determination as to whether a permanent injunc-
tion should issue. The result, however, was not changed and sec-
tion 106 was deemed not to apply to the Telegraph Building, thus
permitting its demolition.' 90 The court's decision, however, is in-
consistent with the "Criteria of Effect and Adverse Effect" set
forth in federal regulations which provide: "An effect may be direct
or indirect."''1 Thus, this case appears to have been incorrectly
decided.
192
Two unreported federal cases are worth noting, Weintraub v.
Provident National Bank' 93 and Nardy v. Secretary of the Inte-
rior.'" In the former case, the National Banking Act' 95 was held to
have been infused with a new dimension by the National Historic
Preservation Act. As a consequence, section 106 was applicable to
the Comptroller of the Currency, requiring him to seek comments
from the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation prior to ap-
proving the demolition of an historic bank building upon construc-
tion of a new facility.1'9
In Nardy, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania upheld the denial of certification for a rehabilitation project
under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, thus denying the building's
owner substantial tax savings. Although the building's facade had
been restored in conformance with the Secretary of the Interior's
Standards for Rehabilitation, the rear of the building and its inte-
rior had been thoroughly modernized in contravention of these
standards. The Department of the Interior, on appeal, indicated
that "the intent of the Federal tax incentives is to preserve entire
buildings and not merely facades.
'"' 7
This case illustrates both the complexity and stakes involved in
190. Id.
191. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3 (1981).
192. See HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 251 n.233.
193. No. 78-1577 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1978).
194. No. 80-3070 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1981), reported in S. Dennis, Currently Pending or
Recently Decided Historic Preservation Court Cases, in HisToic PRESERVATION LAW 621,
672-73 (N. Robinson ed. 1982).
195. 12 U.S.C. § 36(e)(1982) provides: "no branch of any national banking association
shall be ... moved from one location to another without the... approval of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency." Id.
196. See HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 251.
197. Dennis, supra note 194, at 67.
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obtaining certification for the income tax credit available under
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,198 which requires that
historic structures be rehabilitated in accordance with Secretary of
Interior Standards.0 9 A building is automatically a certified his-
toric structure if it is listed individually in the National Register of
Historic Places. However, the National Park Service, aided by
state Historic Preservation officers, must certify buildings in Na-
tional Register districts or state and locally designated districts.
2 00
To obtain the tax credit, rehabilitation costs must be substantial
-in excess of five thousand dollars or the basis of the property
whichever is greater.20 1 Rehabilitated historic structures may qual-
ify for a twenty-five percent tax credit, while non-historic struc-
tures may qualify for either a fifteen percent or twenty percent tax
credit. Although only nonresidential buildings qualify for the latter
credits, the twenty-five percent credit is available for either resi-
dential or nonresidential certified historic structures. 02 The credit
serves to offset the first twenty-five thousand dollars of tax liabil-
ity in full and eighty-five percent of any excess liability in the year
the building is placed in service. On the positive side, any unused
credit may be carried back three years and forward fifteen years
until fully used.20 8 However, on the negative side, investors who
use the twenty-five percent tax credit must deduct one-half the
amount of the credit taken from rehabilitation expenditures in-
cluded in the depreciable basis.' 0' Furthermore, the difference be-
198. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981). I.R.C. § 48 (1982). See HANDBOOK,
supra note 158, at Appendix B for "Overview: Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA") Rules for Real Estate Depreciation and Investment Tax Credit for Qualified Re-
habilitations, as Revised by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
("TEFRA") and the Technical Corrections Act of 1982" prepared by Thomas A. Coughlin
III, Assistant General Counsel, National Trust for Historic Preservation. ERTA repealed
the five-year amortization incentive of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 191 (1976).
199. I.R.C. § 48 (g)(2)(C) (1982). "[T]he term 'certified rehabilitation' means any reha-
bilitation of a certified historic structure which the Secretary of the Interior has certified to
the Secretary as being consistent with the historic character of such property or the district
in which such property is located." Id. See also 36 C.F.R. § 68 (1982).
200. B. Barrett, Certification of Historic Significance, in FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION 44, 44-46 (P.B.I. 1982); see also HANDBOOK, supra note 158, at 467.
Ms. Barrett, Director of Pennsylvania's Bureau of Historic Preservation, details the specific
steps preceding completion of a National Register form, i.e., preparation of an Historic Re-
source Form, and lists the priorities for reviewing nominations to the National Register. See
also "Historic Preservation Certifications Pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the
Revenue Act of 1978," 36 C.F.R. § 67 (1982).
201. I.R.C. § 48(g)(1)(C) (1982).
202. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(F)(i) (1982).
203. I.R.C. § 46(b) (1982).
204. I.R.C. § 48(q) (1982).
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tween accelerated depreciation and allowable straight-line depreci-
ation must be recaptured at sale.20 5 Despite these requirements,
the tax credit for certified rehabilitations of historic structures is of
paramount importance since it provides a strong incentive to pre-
serve rather than demolish historic resources.20 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Commenting on demolition of the Loyal Order of the Moose
Building of 1915, Michael L. Anslie, National Trust for Historic
Preservation president, said "[in] my view Pittsburgh is getting
good value for its effort. Preservationists there are helping a worth-
while project while building institutional relationships that will
earn respect with the development and political communities. Co-
operation like this will in the long run preserve more than the old
rhetoric might have done. 20 7 Clearly, Anslie's remarks are applica-
ble to all preservation efforts in Pennsylvania.
The relative paucity of historic preservation litigation in Penn-
sylvania's state and federal courts suggest that cooperation is pre-
serving historic sites more than litigation. Even though pressure
for repeal of historic district ordinances has arisen, and reduced
federal appropriations threaten to impede preservation efforts in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the state and its citizens have consist-
ently demonstrated initiative and creativity in responding to pres-
ervation challenges such as the demolition of the Moose.
Marnie M. Crouch
205. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1982).
206. I.R.C. § 280B (1982).
207. Preservation News, March 1984, at 5, col.4.
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